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1. Introduction 
As a result of the rapid development of modern Information and 
Communications Technology, the debate about the theory and 
practice of democracy has been revivified. It is widely acknowledged 
that the Internet generates both unique chances and threats to 
traditional democratic institutions and practices. Contributors to the 
debates have all very different points of view, but all seem to 
acknowledge the fact that we are at the crossroads of two important 
developments: the decline of traditional democracy and the rapid 
growth of the new media. 
At this intersection the GII holds of up a promise that we could 
increase the efficiency of our political decision-making, that we could 
increase the level of participation, that new forms of collective 
deliberation could be invented, that less mediation would also mean 
less bias, that services to the citizenry could be more effectively and 
efficiently provided. In short: ICT could be the wonderdrug for the 
democratic deficit that has been building up over the last decades. 
But many authors writing about the potential of ICT for revitalising our 
democracies now begin to put a sense of urgency to their analyses 
and recommendations. Their message is that we have to think about 
democratic institutions in cyberspace now and we have to get it right. 
Here are three examples: 
Lawrence Grossmann in his book The Electronic Republic. 
Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age, states that "without 
conscious and deliberate effort to inform public judgement to put the 
new interactive telecommunications technologies to work on behalf of 
democracy , they are more likely to undermine the democratic 
process than enhance it" (Grossman 1995:31) 
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Benjamin Barber (Barber 1998:237) -a renowned scholar of forms of 
strong, participatory democracy states that "This may be our last 
opportunity to turn the technology of the new age into a servant of an 
old political ideal: democracy". 
Authors who study the economics and dynamics of Large 
Technological Systems (LTS), such as nation-wide air traffic control 
systems, electricity networks, networked computer systems, large 
nuclear powerplants, state that a lack of knowledge and reflection 
"can set public organisations on path dependent directions that may 
be undesirable and difficult to change " (Demchak, e.a. 1998: 226). 
According to these studies "early technical decisions may set the 
structural and cognitive conditions for organisational effectiveness 
and ethics. Value choices underlying system designs and policies are 
not always readily apparent , but close attention to them is vital if these 
large technical systems are to be established and to function in ways 
to support democratic goals and practices" (ibid.). Deborah Johnson 
has carefully articulated in which ways the design of information 
infrastructures may be affected by value choices (Johnson 1998). 
  
2. An Epistemic Conception of Democracy 
Apart from the sense of urgency that is apparent from these writings, 
another remarkable feature may be found in contemporary studies 
about democracy in an electronic age. It is the idea that democracy 
may be our only chance to get it right with respect to resolving the 
complex social problems of our increasingly complex societies. 
Grossmann observes (Grossman 1995) that: "American liberal 
philosopher John Dewey provided the contemporary rationale for 
American Society to view widespread civic participation and 
collective deliberation as high priorities. As in jury trials, truth has a 
better chance of emerging from group deliberation than from a single 
authority, Dewey said, no matter how expert, experienced and 
sophisticated that authority may be. Public decision making, he 
argued, achieves more than the sum of its parts, (... ) he insisted that 
inquiry and communication are the keys to a functioning democracy". 
What is presented here in the context of an analysis of the 
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repercussions and possibilities of ICT is the sketch of a particular 
conception of democracy, which is most certainly congenial to a 
knowledge and information society, but is non-standard in the 
philosophy of democracy: It is a distinctively epistemic or cognitive 
conception (Cohen (1986) and Estlund (1993; 1997)). Democracy 
and democratic institutions are to be preferred to others because they 
are superior in their quality of epistemic practice. Democracy is about 
knowledge and learning according to this view. This type of 
justification shifts our attention away from a Kantian or Rawlsian 
justification of democracy which singles out the autonomy and equal 
worth of individuals as moral persons, whatever the epistemic 
consequences. According to the epistemic conception of democracy 
the primary reasons to prefer democratic arrangements is that they 
will lead us to the most adequate, intelligent or possibly even 'true' 
answers to our political questions, not that they promote fairness and 
justice. 
Benjamin Barber observes: "Taking their cue from the eighteenth 
century Frenchman Condorcet, enthusiasts like Wriston, Toffier, 
Naisbett and Bill Gates have all composed odes to the emancipatory, 
democratic powers of the startling new technologies (... )" (Barber 
1998:272) He could also have added names like Dyson, Negroponte, 
Barlow, Rheingold, Kelly, or other 'cyberlibertarians' as Langdon 
Winner has aptly called them. 
One could argue that that Barber is cutting historical corners here, but 
his remark is actually very much to the point, since it serves to draw 
attention to the epistemic conception of democracy we identified 
above. To fully appreciate Barbers remark we have to bear in mind 
that Condorcet's best known theoretical contribution to democracy 
theory is his proof of the so-called jury theorem, which roughly says 
that if voters are individually better than chance to get it right on some 
yes or no question, then under simple majority rule, they will 
collectively be infallible, provided that the group is sufficiently large. If 
you flip an unfair coin -let's say it is weighted in such a way as to 
produce 6 head to 4 tails every ten times it is flipped- it will only 
produce that ratio if you flip it a sufficiently large number of times. Now 
substitute the 60/40 heads tail chance by a 60 % chance to get it right 
on a given yes/no question and replace individual coinflippings by 
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individual votings. If the number of people who take part in a political 
voting is large enough, and the individual voters are competent, if only 
in a weak sense, i.e. more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, the 
democratic decision by simple majority vote will produce the right 
social preference. It will be clear that this establishes an important 
result for an epistemic conception of democracy. Simple majority rule 
as Ariadne’s thread out of the political labyrinth, if its is only long 
enough. 
The epistemic conception of democracy also gets support from other 
unexpected sides: economic modelling of scientific research, parallel 
distributed processing and artificial life research. Let’s turn to a well 
known researcher in the A-life research and member of the legendary 
Santa Fe institute: Stuart Kaufmann. According to Kaufmann in his 
book At Home in the Universe " ( ) our theory of democracy takes 
little account of the unfolding, evolving nature of cultures, economies, 
and societies". (Kaufmann 1995: 299). In the introduction of his book 
he expands upon the relation between democracy and research in 
chaos theory and non-linear systems: "The edge of chaos may even 
provide a deep new understanding of the logic of democracy". (..) (I)n 
the following chapters we will find surprising new grounds for the 
secular wisdom of democracy in its capacity to solve extra hard 
problems characterised by intertwining webs of conflicting interest ( ) 
we will see hints of an apologia for a pluralistic society as the natural 
design for adaptive compromise. Democracy may be far and away 
the best process to solve the complex problems of a complex evolving 
society" (Kaufmann 1995:28). 
And more cyber enthusiast now seem to be betting on this approach 
to democracy. In a contribution to Network & Netplay, virtual groups 
on the Internet (Sudweeks 1998), the authors take as their point of 
departure that the internet community is a society of distributed 
intelligent agents, which forms a large 'expert system with a scope 
and scale well beyond that yet conceivable with computer based 
systems alone'. 
Recently, no one less than Harvard Philosopher Hilary Putnam has 
also defended the epistemic conception of Democracy which he 
refers to as Deweyan Democracy. A brief characterisation of Dewey's 
position according to Putnam could be summarised as follows: 
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Democracy is the form of Intelligent conduct of communal inquiry and 
not just one form of social life ( ) it is the precondition for the full 
application of intelligence to the solution of social problems" (Putnam 
1995:180). This implies among other things; 1) the unimpeded flow of 
information and the most extensive freedom to offer and criticise 
opinions, 2) the absence of epistemic privileges, which as Putnam 
puts it, "inevitably produce cognitive distortion". 
The following characteristics can be found in both Dewey's and 
Putnam's conception of democracy: 
1.Liberalism; the most extensive scheme of information and 
communication liberties; don't block the road to inquiry! 
2.Cognitivism; that is the view in this context that individual input in the 
democratic process consist of beliefs or opinions about what is the 
right thing to do. 
3. Objectivism, at least a weak form of objectivism, that is 
incompatible with moral scepticism. Some objective standard (not 
necessarily an independent standard) of what counts as a satisfactory 
or correct solution to a social or political problem. 
4. Fallibilism; the collectively endorsed outcomes of democratic 
processes are in no way indefeasible, or immune to revision. 
5. Instrumentalism; the solutions that are reached have the status of 
hypotheses, which have to be implemented (Dewey calls this 
existential application) and revised if proven unsatisfactory in their 
consequences. 
6. Deliberativism: to make full use of information, insights and the 
wisdom of others, people ought to be constantly in communication 
and discussion about their ideas on what is the preferred course of 
action. 
7.Meliorism; that is the belief that our societies may change for the 
better if we conduct our business in an intelligent way. 
8. Holism, that is the idea that the unit of intelligence is the community, 
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the social system as a whole, and that this whole is more that the sum 
of its parts. 
9 Epistemic Egalitarianism: there are no epistemic privileges, which 
as Putnam stated 'inevitably produce cognitive distortion'. 
  
3. Some problems with epistemic egalitarianism 
Now I would like to focus on this last characteristic -the radical 
epistemic egalitarianism which Putnam seems to think is an extremely 
important element of Deweyan Democracy and discuss two epistemic 
phenomena which may cast doubt upon its viability, both off and on-
line. 
The first is connected with what John Hardwig has called 'epistemic 
dependence' or deferral to experts or epistemic authority and the 
second is related to what Goldman has called 'epistemic paternalism', 
or filtering of information or exercising control over communication 
channels. Both phenomena relativize cognitive self-sufficiency and 
intellectual autonomy of individuals. And if these phenomena should 
prove to be justifiable in addition to being massively endorsed, than 
this would suggest that some of us ought to be seen as more equal 
than others from the epistemic point of view. The question should 
therefore be addressed whether these forms of epistemic inequality 
are co-tenable with the epistemic conception of democracy and its 
implied epistemic egalitarianism. 
3.1 Epistemic Dependence 
We live in a complex world and science has progressed to the point 
where we can no longer hope to be intimately acquainted personally 
with the evidence for our claims to know. If we say that we know that 
smoking causes cancer we are not able to produce the histological or 
epidemiological evidence for that claim ourselves; we rely upon the 
experts. And in supporting policies directed at banning tobacco 
advertisements, we simply assume that it's true. Due to a rapid 
division of intellectual labour, we are becoming more dependent and 
less epistemically self sufficient. This not only applies to lay people, 
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but to scientists as well. In large collaborative research projects like 
the human genome project or in elementary particle physics, scientific 
publications are sometime co-authored by hundreds of researchers, 
and for each of them individually holds that they are unable not only 
qua time, but also qua expertise - to evaluate the research results of a 
large part of the colleague researchers in that project. 
The principle of justification which seems to lie behind our endorsing 
the practice of deferring to experts, was I think correctly identified by 
John Hardwig as the principle of epistemic dependence: If I have 
good reasons to believe that Einstein had good reasons to believe 
that E=mc2, then I my self have good reasons to believe that E=mc2. 
When we rely on the judgement of others in complicated matters, will 
we always be able to give independent reasons for thinking that our 
judgements are correct? Will it still be the case as Putnam puts it that 
the autonomous persons can no more imagine giving up his 
autonomy, his capacity to think for himself and his habit of exercising 
that capacity, than he can imagine submitting to a lobotomy. 
I think the answer is 'No'. Inquiry, scientific and non-scientific, contrary 
to what Putnam may wants us to believe, forms a delicate fabric of 
deferral, epistemic dependence and trust where individual scientists 
have given up on pursuing the enlightenment ideal of thinking through 
everything all by themselves. Some sources are taken much more 
serious than others. The Internet and WWW only exacerbate this 
tendency to defer and rely. 
3.2 Epistemic Paternalism 
The second phenomenon, which has to be addressed by the 
defenders of epistemic democracy and its implied egalitarianism is 
what Alvin Goldman has called epistemic paternalism. Ordinary 
paternalism is defined as restraining someone's freedom or 
interfering with someone's liberty and justifying it by appeal to the best 
interest of the persons thus restrained. In epistemic paternalism B 
may prevent A from receiving or accessing information with the 
justification that access to that information by A would make it more 
unlikely that A would come to have true beliefs than when not having 
access to that information. A case in point is Rule 403 of the USA 
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Federal Rules of Evidence which states that:" Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury". The judge may for example decide to keep 
certain probabilistic information from the jurors because he knows that 
according to some well established theory of cognitive psychology 
they are more likely to get it wrong when they use it in their reasoning 
and deliberations. Again the Internet and WWW only increase the 




Although these inegalitarian epistemic practices of deferral and 
paternalism may be locally justified, we feel a moral uneasiness with 
endorsing them on a global level and making them principal moral 
policy and the cornerstones of new political institutions. Our 
scepticism in this case may be analogous to our doubts about Millean 
plural voting schemes. The reasons for scepticism are clear: there are 
questions about identifiablity of expertise (who knows who the 
knowers are?), there are questions of the stability and moral 
trustworthiness of those endowed with epistemic authority, probably 
questions about equal opportunity to learn for those who are 
supposed to be epistemically less qualified. And probably also 
questions about how this may affect person's basis for self-respect. 
So the epistemic defence of democracy and its implied epistemic 
egalitarianism seem to have to either rule out these uneven 
distributions of epistemic authority or make allowance for them. If it 
does not make allowance for them its seems to fly in the face of 
massively endorsed epistemic practices, if it does make allowance 
for them it has to do so in a way that would not betray its central 
egalitarian idea and answers the skeptical questions that can be 
raised in connection with the role of experts in democracies. There 
may be a third response, simply saying that the epistemic gains of 
local epistemic inequalities outweigh the global gains of not having 
them. But that may be hard to prove outside limited and highly 
specialised areas of expertise. 
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Let us suppose that the advocates of an epistemic conception of 
democracy would try to accommodate epistemic inequalities, how 
could they do that so as not to produce obviously unacceptable moral 
results. 
Putnam mentions the fact that Dewey did consider the idea that those 
without expertise are required to defer to the authority of experts, but 
that he rejected this for empirical reasons (Putnam 1995: 188). But if 
we would limit ourselves to empirical reasons, there is no independent 
standard of justice to keep this natural process of ‘growing ‘ political 
truths in societies of minds, in check. Putnam acknowledges in 
passing that like all consequentialist views, Dewey's has trouble doing 
justice to considerations of right (Putnarn 1995: 190), although he 
does not draw further consequences from that. 
Bertrand Russell as early as 1909 already saw what the potential 
problems could be with such a view: According to Russell standards 
of justice should not be the effect but the cause of the wishes of the 
community. Pragmatism begins with liberty and toleration, develops, 
by inherent necessity, into an appeal to force and ‘the arbitrament of 
the big battalions’. I think Russell correctly identified this as a crucial 
problem fort an epistemic and consequentialist idea of democracy. 
  
5. Epistemic checks and moral balances 
I think that if Putnam and the cyberlibertarians want their idea to work 
as a full-fledged conception of democracy that may provide guidance 
in the design of political institutions of the 21 century, they need to 
address these issues. They may for example want to say that 
epistemic inequalities -epistemic dependence and epistemic 
paternalism - are justified only if: 
1) They occur in a community the epistemic practices of which satisfy 
certain standards for epistemic success. E.g. the one’s identified by 
Alvin Goldman (1992) and applied to the Internet by Paul Thagard 
(1997) : 
a) Power of an epistemic practice: its ability to help users find true 
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answers to the questions that interest them 
b) Fecundity of a practice: its ability to lead to a large number of true 
beliefs for many users 
c) Speed of a practice: how quickly it leads to true answers 
d) Efficiency of a practice is how well it limits the cost of getting true 
answers 
e) Reliability of a practice: measured by the ratio of truths to the total 
number of beliefs 
fostered by the practice. 
2) They occur in a community that is well-ordered, that is effectively 
regulated by a set of (e.g. Rawlsian) principles of justice held in wide 
reflective equilibrium, which would among others things imply that the 
inequalities are to the advantage of those who are worst off in the 
community. 
Putnam's rather one-sided epistemic interpretation of Deweyan 
democracy does probably no justice to Dewey’s philosophy of 
experience, the individual and moral value. Philosophers like Rorty 
and Putnam -be it for quite different reasons have embraced what 
they take to be the anti-metaphysical tenets in Dewey’s pragmatic 
political philosophy, and leave out of consideration his metaphysics of 
the person. 
Recently Festenstein (1997) and Westbrook (1991) have shown that 
Dewey's political philosophy and his epistemic conception of 
democracy are supported by a particular view of human flourishing, 
which gives a central role to personal experience, individual choice 
and equality of opportunity. If the idea of the unique moral worth of 
individuals and standards of social justice which are based upon 
them, would be absent from Epistemic Democracy, cyber-
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